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International Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and Why 
by 
Susan D. Franck* 
 
We know several things about foreign investment.  First, foreign investment matters, reaching 
US$1.7 trillion in 2008.  Second, we know that foreign investors have new international law rights 
to protect their economic interests.  Third, we know that those rights are now being used.   
 
So since we now know that the international legal risk is not illusory, the real questions are: who 
wins, who loses and why?   
 
While various commentators have asserted a variety of answers to those questions, many have done 
so without reference to valid and reliable data.1  In its most benign form, these observations create 
misinformation but, perhaps more troublingly, might also lead to policy choices based upon 
unrepresentative anecdotal evidence, supposition or political rhetoric. To help alleviate these 
possible outcomes, this Perspective reviews recent empirical research2 in order to provide basic 
information to fundamental questions about investment treaty arbitration (ITA) to create a more 
accurate framework for policy choices and dispute-resolution strategies.  
 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. The author thanks Andrea Bjorklund, 
Christopher Drahozal, Mark Drumbl, Ian Laird, Clint Peinhardt, Andrea Schneider, Jason Yackee and David Zaring for 
their comments on an earlier draft.  Professor Franck can be contacted at francks@wlu.edu. The views expressed by 
the author in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Columbia University or its partners and 
supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives is a peer-reviewed series. 
1 See, e.g., Press Release, Food and Water Watch, World Bank Court Grants Power to Corporations (Apr. 30, 2007), 
available at http:// www.foodandwaterwatch.org/press/releases/world-bank-court-grants-power-to-corporations-
article12302007.   
2 See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. R . 1, 16-23 
(2007) [hereinafter Evaluating Claims] (describing the method of gathering data from publicly available arbitration 
award to identify 102 public awards from 82 disputes that resulted in 52 final determinations); Susan D. Franck, 
Development and Outcomes of Investment Arbitration Awards, 50  L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1406714 [hereinafter Development and Outcomes] (conducting chi-
square and analyses of variance tests at significance levels of α = .05).  
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So who does win and lose international investment treaty arbitration?  The answer is: both foreign 
investors and host states win and lose.3  The data suggest, however, that they lose in reasonably 
equivalent proportions. Not including the disputes that ended with an award embodying a 
settlement, respondent governments, for example, won approximately 58% of the time.  Meanwhile, 
investors won 39% of the cases.4 
 
Winning and losing, however, is not just about whether there is a breach of the underlying 
investment treaty.  The amount awarded is also critical.  Despite the fact that investors claimed 
US$343 million in damages on average, that is not what they received.  Rather, tribunals awarded 
investors only US$10 million on average.  This US$333 million difference is not insubstantial, and 
it may give investors a basis for some reflection about the value of arbitration – particularly given 
the need to pay the arbitral tribunal and the other legal costs associated with bringing a claim.5      
 
Knowing which parties actually win and lose begs a further question – namely: why are parties 
successful?  This question is critical given suggestions that ITA is potentially biased.6  There has 
been some debate about whether respondents’ development status or whether arbitrators come from 
the developing world improperly affects outcome.  If these development variables cause particular 
results, this would raise issues about the integrity of investment treaties and arbitration.   
 
To address this critical issue, recent research considered whether there was a reliable statistical link 
between the level of development and ITA outcomes.  The results suggest that development 
variables did not generally cause particular outcomes.  One study found that there was no 
relationship between a government’s level of development and the outcome of ITA.7   
 
A second study then showed that – at a general level – outcome was not reliably associated with the 
development status of the respondent, the development status of the presiding arbitrator, or some 
interaction between those two variables.  This held true for both: (1) winning or losing investment 
treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts tribunals awarded against governments. Follow-up tests in the 
same study showed, however, that there were two statistically significant effects – found in one sub-
set of potentially non-representative cases – that suggest arbitration must be used carefully in 
certain situations.  Only where the presiding arbitrator was from a middle income country, the data 
showed that high income countries received statistically lower awards than: (1) upper-middle 
income respondents, and (2) low income respondents.  Nevertheless, in other circumstances 
involving middle income presiding arbitrators or all cases involving presiding arbitrators from high 
                                                 
3 This Perspective defines “winning” and “losing” using quantitative measures: (a) a binary yes/no answer about 
whether a government breached a treaty, or (b) a scaled quantitative variable of damages awarded.  Qualitative 
approaches might assess experiences with ITA and measure “success” differently.  Subjective approaches could 
consider how parties, with varying levels of familiarity with ITA, and other situational differences understand success. 
4 Approximately 4% of the cases were settlement agreements. Figures do not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
5 Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, supra note 2 at 49-50, 64. 
6 See, e.g., Third World Network, Finance: Bias Seen in International Dispute Arbiters, June 22, 2007 (JUN07/02), 
available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/twninfofinance060702.htm (“A little-known entity closely 
affiliated with the World Bank that mediates disputes between sovereign nations and foreign investors appears to be 
skewed toward corporations in Northern countries”); Gus van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 E  L 121, 148 (2006) (“No matter how well arbitrators do their 
job, an award will always be open to an apprehension of an institutional bias against the respondent state”). 
7 Susan D. Franck, Considering Recalibration of International Investment Agreements: Empirical Insights, in José E. 
Alvarez, Karl P. Sauvant and Kamil Gerard Ahmed, The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, 
Realities, Options (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2009).  
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income countries, the amounts awarded were statistically equivalent.8  In other words, in limited 
circumstances, tribunals with presiding arbitrators from middle income countries made awards that 
tended to favor developed countries and were different than one might expect from chance alone.   
 
The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1) ITA is the equivalent of tossing a two-
headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the developing world is treated unfairly in ITA, and (3) 
arbitrators from the developed and developing world decide cases differently.  The evidence creates 
a basis for cautious optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests radical overhaul, rejection or 
rebalancing of these procedural rights is not necessarily warranted.  While the follow-up tests and 
limitations of the data suggest optimism must be tempered properly, a sensible approach would 
involve creating targeted solutions to address particularized problems and enacting targeted reforms 
to redress perceived concerns about the international investment regime.   
 
Ultimately, the data suggest that investors and governments won and lost in relatively equal 
measure, but governments won a bit more.  While the data show also that, when they did win, 
investors ended up with substantially less than they requested.  Moreover, the data do not establish 
that a respondent’s development status was a reason why investors or governments were successful 
in pursuing arbitration.  This suggests that why a party wins or loses arbitration may ultimately have 
more to do with factors other than development, such as the merits of a particular claim or defense.  
Other factors may also be linked with outcome, such as the business sector involved, the amounts 
claimed or the type of host state government, but they may not necessarily cause particular results.  
This suggests that although there are risks in pursing arbitration, there will be times when it is 
warranted and, ultimately, parties should think carefully about why arbitration is in their interests.   
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